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I take Gelfert’s implicit Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services Authenticated Download Date | 7/1/15 9:21 PM 28 � Entity Realism conclusion to be that the failure of reference for quasi-particle terms implies the non-existence of quasi-particles. However, the experimental realist should resist the presupposition that we can only successfully refer to entities of which we can identify the “material basis”. Why not identify quasi-particles in the same way as electrons, namely via their causal properties?

Let us grant Suárez that warrant does not entail truth (although see Moon (2012) and references therein for arguments to the contrary). Would it not be strange for a realist to refrain from ever asserting a statement of the form “x is real”? Suárez agrees, and he consequently does not think of his position as a realism at all: “A more appropriate name for my views would be ‘the experimental attitude’, as among all contemporary epistemological views it is closer to the ‘neither-realism-nor-antirealism’ of Arthur Fine’s NOA” (139).

The shift should not be from manipulation to presupposition, but from manipulation to causal explanation. Is It Su�cient? While it is quite natural to question the necessity of Hacking’s criterion, it is not easy to see how manipulability could fail to be a su�cient condition for reality. The very notion of “manipulating something” seems to imply that this something must exist. Nevertheless, the su�ciency of the manipulability criterion has been questioned in two ways. The �rst one is mainly epistemic: If we knew that we are able to manipulate some entity x, we could indeed conclude that x is real, but in 3 In this context, Margaret Morrison (1990, sec.