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By J. Aaron Simmons
With a last bankruptcy taking a look at destiny instructions for examine on attainable intersections among new phenomenology and analytic philosophy, this can be a necessary learn for someone looking an summary of this crucial strand of latest eu thought.
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Additional info for The New Phenomenology: A Philosophical Introduction
Example text
As we will see throughout this book, the new phenomenologists generally “innovate” in the name of orthodoxy: they claim that their ways of reframing phenomenology are really more “orthodox” (true belief) than the “orthodoxy” assumed to be authoritative in the phenomenological tradition. So the fundamental question for any student of new phenomenology is: who really has the “right” version of phenomenology and who is really the “heretic”? Could it be possible that Derrida is wrong when he accuses Marion of being a phenomenological heretic?
In Heidegger’s characteristic, even if occasionally problematic, mode of interpreting Greek philosophy, he says that the Greek phrase is better understood as “presencing namely presences” [anwest nämlich Anwesen] (2003, 79). Of course, one might quickly protest that surely a long ensnarment in Parmenides’s claim could yield a more understandable philosophical explanation. Nonetheless, while noting the tautological dimension of this way of rendering the passage, Heidegger makes the rather odd claim: “We are here in the domain of the inapparent: presencing itself presences” (2003, 79).
Said a bit more simply, we can think about our thinking about something. 2, 278). 2, 278), we will continue to search in vain. There is no thing in outer sense or inner sense that corresponds to being. 2, 278). 2, 278). Yet, if Husserl is right to say that the only objects in which the phenomenologist is interested are those that, in some sense, appear to consciousness, and the only meaning available within a phenomenological framework is that which is rooted in lived experience, then what are we to make of being, especially as expressed in the copula (“x is y”)?