Download Understanding Representation in the Cognitive Sciences - by Alexander Riegler PDF
By Alexander Riegler
This quantity argues in want of rethinking easy concerns in cognitive technological know-how within the context of modern advancements. a few matters which are investigated contain: the significance of simulation as a methodological instrument for concept improvement in cognitive technological know-how, the necessity of linguistic transparency in types of cognition, and the embodiment of information in its substratum, for instance, in neural constitution. the quantity sketches the epistemological and methodological implications for cognitive technological know-how and its similar disciplines. those concerns contain the evolution of semantics and image grounding in addition because the layout of self reliant structures appearing within the `real' international, both as robots or as software program.
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Additional resources for Understanding Representation in the Cognitive Sciences - Does Representation Need Reality?
Example text
Models One of the main cases that has been made for what I will call empirical antirepresentationalism has been made concerning connectionist networks by William Ramsey. Many connectionist theorists, he claims, fail to notice this and still posit representations in their systems because they have failed to appreciate just how radical and unconventional their theory of the mind really is. It is, instead, something cognitive scientists often combine with dynamics. But many cognitive scientists who favor the dynamical systems approach feel that cognitive science would be better off without the notion of representation (see van Gelder 1998).
This goes to prove, once again, how valuable a model the computer has become for cognitive science even without subscribing to computationalism! Most cognitive scientists, I take it, are currently dreaming of a similarly revealing link between neurobiological concepts and the human consciousness. 18 It is crucial to this method that there are no "right" descriptions; all those descriptions are mere constructions of our conceptual system. 19 Obviously, much depends on one's theoretical stance with respect to scientific theories: instrumentalists will certainly be more generous that realists in this respect.
Furthermore, I will argue below that Gibsonian psychologists (Gibson 1979; Michaels and Carello 1981) ought to be seen as unwitting metaphysical anti representationalists. By keeping this distinction between metaphysical and empirical antirepresentationalism in mind, we can make some headway in understanding what exactly is meant by those who claim to be antirepresentationalists. If cognition in general works like this model does, there are no representations in cognition either. The models cited tend to be either connectionist networks or dynamical systems models, where dynamical systems models are construed widely to include situated robots (as Beer 1995, for example construes them).